This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Optimal Monetary Policy and the Asset Market:A Non-cooperative Game

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Christos Ioannidis,
Oreste Napolitano ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In this paper we construct a model of a policy game in order to analyse the optimal reaction function of the Central Bank to a shock in the asset market. In doing so, we consider three different noncooperative games: Nash equilibrium, Stackelberg equilibrium with “FED” as leader and “ECB” Stacklberg as leader. Three major conclusions can be drawn from our work in the presence of asset market shocks. First, in the Nash equilibrium the ECB will adopt a less restrictive monetary policy compared to the FED’s behaviour. Second, comparing the Nash and Stackelberg non-cooperative equilibria, the Stackelberg solution is certainly superior when the FED is the leader, but the Nash solution is superior for the follower. Finally, irrespective of where the shocks originate, if the FED would choose the Stackelberg leader equilibrium the ECB would minimize its social loss along with a lower level of interest rates.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.brunel.ac.uk/329/efwps/03-25.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Economics and Finance Section, School of Social Sciences, Brunel University in its series Economics and Finance Discussion Papers with number 03-25.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bru:bruedp:03-25

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Brunel University, Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH, UK

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (John.Hunter).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Brayton, Flint & Levin, Andrew & Lyon, Ralph & Williams, John C., 1997. "The evolution of macro models at the Federal Reserve Board," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 43-81, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Walsh, Carl E, 1999. "Announcements, Inflation Targeting and Central Bank Incentives," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 66(262), pages 255-69, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1990. " Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(1), pages 31-48, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Goodhart, Charles & Hofmann, Boris, 2000. "Financial Variables and the Conduct of Monetary Policy," Working Paper Series 112, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden). [Downloadable!]
  5. Glenn D. Rudebusch & Lars E. O. Svensson, 1998. "Policy rules for inflation targeting," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Mar.
    Other versions:
  6. Alan S. Blinder, 1999. "Central Banking in Theory and Practice," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262522608.
  7. Taylor, John B., 1993. "Discretion versus policy rules in practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 195-214, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Andrew J. Filardo, 2000. "Monetary policy and asset prices," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q III, pages 11-37. [Downloadable!]
  9. James M. Poterba, 2000. "Stock Market Wealth and Consumption," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(2), pages 99-118, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Karen E. Dynan & Dean M. Maki, 2001. "Does stock market wealth matter for consumption?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2001-23, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  11. Ben Bernanke & Mark Gertler, 1999. "Monetary policy and asset price volatility," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 77-128. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can include your works in the database easily by uploading them on the Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA) if you do not have access to an institutional RePEc archive.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-13.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.