Civil Conflict: Ended Or Never Ending?
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Brown University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 99-33.
Date of creation: 1999
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Postal: Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912
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- Herbert E. Scarf, 1965. "The Core of an N Person Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 182R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudholter, 2004. "Bargaining Sets of Voting Games," Discussion Paper Series, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem dp376, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Vohra, Rajiv, 1991. "An existence theorem for a bargaining set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 19-34.
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