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• C. Simon Fan
• Herschel I. Grossman

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Paper provided by Brown University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 98-8.

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Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision: Sep 1998
Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:98-8

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1. Acemoglu, Daron & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1999. " Information Accumulation in Development," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 5-38, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Acemoglu, D. & Zilibotti, F., 1998. "Information Accumulation in Development," Papers 652, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
   • Acemoglu, Daron & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1998. "Information Accumulation in Development," Seminar Papers 652, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies. [Downloadable!]
2. Acemoglu, D. & Verdier, T., 1996. "Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach," Working papers 96-5, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
   Other versions:
   • Acemoglu, D. & Verdier, T., 1996. "Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach," DELTA Working Papers 96-12, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
   • Acemoglu, Daron & Verdier, Thierry, 1996. "Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 1494, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Acemoglu, Daron & Verdier, Thierry, 1998. "Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(450), pages 1381-1403, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Gordon, Roger H & Li, David Daokui, 1997. "Taxes and Government Incentives: Eastern Europe vs. China," CEPR Discussion Papers 1657, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Daron Acemoglu & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 1996. "Agency Costs in the Process of Development," Economics Working Papers 157, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Acemoglu, Daron & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1997. "Agency costs in the process of development," Seminar Papers 607, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies. [Downloadable!]
   • Acemoglu, Daron & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1996. "Agency Costs in the Process of Development," CEPR Discussion Papers 1421, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Acemoglu, D & Zilibotti, F, 1996. "Agency Costs in the Process of Development," Papers 607, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
   • Acemoglu, D. & Zilibotti, F., 1996. "Agency Costs in the Process of Development," Working papers 96-8, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
5. Blanchard, O & Kremer, M, 1996. "Disorganization," Working papers 96-30, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
   Other versions:
   • Olivier Blanchard & Michael Kremer, 1997. "Disorganization," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 38, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
   • Blanchard, Olivier & Kremer, Michael, 1997. "Disorganization," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1091-1126, November.
6. Banerjee, A.V., 1997. "A Theory of Misgovernance," Working papers 97-4, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
7. Isaac Ehrlich & Francis T. Lui, 1999. "Bureaucratic Corruption and Endogenous Economic Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(S6), pages S270-S293, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Chen, Kang & Jefferson, Gary H. & Singh, Inderjit, 1992. "Lessons from China's economic reform," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 201-225, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Lui, Francis T, 1985. "An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 760-81, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Banerjee, Abhijit V, 1997. "A Theory of Misgovernance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1289-1332, November.

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