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Efficiency in Optimal Auctions with Common Uncertainty

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Author Info
Lester M.K. Kwong () (Department of Economics, Brock University)

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Abstract

This paper considers optimal auctions where individuals' valuations have both a private and common value component. We show that when the set of potential buyers and seller are symmetrically uninformed regarding the common value component, it may be socially optimal not to resolve this common uncertainty. Under the sufficient conditions provided to generate this outcome, efficiency will be restored in the optimal auction.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Brock University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0502.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2005
Date of revision: May 2005
Handle: RePEc:brk:wpaper:0502

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Related research
Keywords: Auctions; Efficiency; Common value; Uncertainty;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-18.

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