Ideology, Competence and Luck: What determines general election results?
AbstractThis paper investigates the impact of luck, defined as global economic growth, and competence, defined as the difference between domestic and world growth, on voting in general elections since 1960. The vote of incumbent parties of the right is found to be sensitive to luck, whereas that of incumbent parties of the left is not. This is consistent with the Clientele Hypothesis given electorates which fail to perfectly distinguish luck from competence. Economic competence plays a strong role in determining the vote, especially in high-income democracies. The electoral reward to competence is essentially equal across parties of either ideology, contra to the Saliency Hypothesis. The data are also supportive of the Territory Hypothesis, namely that greater ideological territory increases a party's relative vote share.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK in its series Bristol Economics Discussion Papers with number 08/607.
Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2008
Date of revision:
voting; ideology; luck; competence;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-11-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-11-25 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2008-11-25 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Nordhaus, William D, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 169-90, April.
- Holcombe, Randall G, 1980. "An Empirical Test of the Median Voter Model," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 18(2), pages 260-74, April.
- Andrew Leigh, 2004.
"Does the World Economy Swing National Elections?,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
485, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University.
- Mulligan, Casey B & Hunter, Charles G, 2003.
" The Empirical Frequency of a Pivotal Vote,"
Springer, vol. 116(1-2), pages 31-54, July.
- Casey B. Mulligan & Charles G. Hunter, 2001. "The Empirical Frequency of a Pivotal Vote," NBER Working Papers 8590, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Casey B. Mulligan & Charles G. Hunter, 2000. "The Empirical Frequency of a Pivotal Vote," Working Papers 0025, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago.
- Swank, O.H., 1991.
"Popularity Functions Based on the Partisan Theory,"
9112-g, Erasmus University of Rotterdam - Institute for Economic Research.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jonathan Temple).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.