A political regime has budgetary separation of powers if the power with the prerogative to raise taxes is not the full residual claimant of a tax increase. In the American states two conditions are needed: the governor must have the line item veto, and the political interests of the legislative majority and the governor must not be perfectly aligned. Political alignment between the executive and the legislative depends on the numbers of seats the governor's party controls in the state legislature; it changes discontinuously as we move from a unifed to a divided government. We use regression discontinuity design to establish a causal relation between a divided government and lower tax rates in states with line item veto. In states with block veto such relation is not present. We estimate the jump in the tax level at the discontinuity semiparametrically.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
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