Who works in the public sector? Evidence from the World Values Survey
AbstractEarlier single-country studies found a higher level of intrinsic motivation among public sector workers, compared to the private sector. Using data from the World Values Survey, covering 51 countries, we find a tendency for public sector workers to be more intrinsically motivated, but this is not a universal relationship: we also show that the level of government corruption (appropriately instrumented) explains some of the variation across countries. Consistent with earlier studies that find that selection accounts for differential motivation across sectors, we show that intrinsically-motivated workers are less likely to work in the public sector when corruption is higher.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK in its series The Centre for Market and Public Organisation with number 11/268.
Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2011
Date of revision:
Intrinsic motivation; public sector; corruption;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
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