Does Performance Monitoring Work? A Review of the Evidence from the UK Public Sector, Excluding Health Care
AbstractThis paper reviews that use of performance monitoring in the UK public sector, excluding its use in health care. Our focus is on finding robust evidence that evaluates the success of the introduction of performance monitoring in terms of its impact both on behaviour and on final outcomes. We begin with a general discussion of performance monitoring (hereafter PM), before considering the nature of the public sector and the implications of this for the implementation of such shemes within it. We then review the evidence and find a general lack of quantitative evidence on the impact of PM schemes on outcomes. This is partly due to the problem of attributing changes in outcome to the introduction of a specific PM scheme. One of our recommendations, therefore, is to consider piloting of PM schemes more widely in order to provide such evidence prior to national implementation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK in its series The Centre for Market and Public Organisation with number 02/049.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2002
Date of revision:
performance monitoring; public sector;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-11-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAB-2003-11-03 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-MFD-2003-11-03 (Microfinance)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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