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Does Performance Monitoring Work? A Review of the Evidence from the UK Public Sector, Excluding Health Care

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  • Simon Burgess
  • Carol Propper
  • Deborah Wilson

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Abstract

This paper reviews that use of performance monitoring in the UK public sector, excluding its use in health care. Our focus is on finding robust evidence that evaluates the success of the introduction of performance monitoring in terms of its impact both on behaviour and on final outcomes. We begin with a general discussion of performance monitoring (hereafter PM), before considering the nature of the public sector and the implications of this for the implementation of such shemes within it. We then review the evidence and find a general lack of quantitative evidence on the impact of PM schemes on outcomes. This is partly due to the problem of attributing changes in outcome to the introduction of a specific PM scheme. One of our recommendations, therefore, is to consider piloting of PM schemes more widely in order to provide such evidence prior to national implementation.

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File URL: http://www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/workingpapers/wp49.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK in its series The Centre for Market and Public Organisation with number 02/049.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bri:cmpowp:02/049

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Keywords: performance monitoring; public sector;

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  1. Croxson, B. & Propper, C. & Perkins, A., 2001. "Do doctors respond to financial incentives? UK family doctors and the GP fundholder scheme," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 375-398, February.
  2. Propper, Carol & Croxson, Bronwyn & Shearer, Arran, 2002. "Waiting times for hospital admissions: the impact of GP fundholding," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 227-252, March.
  3. Courty, Pascal & Marschke, Gerald, 1997. "Measuring Government Performance: Lessons from a Federal Job-Training Program," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 383-88, May.
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Cited by:
  1. Courty, Pascal & Marschke, Gerald, 2004. "A General Test of Gaming," CEPR Discussion Papers 4514, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Deborah Wilson & Bronwyn Croxson & Adele Atkinson, 2004. "“What Gets Measured Gets Done”: Headteachers’ Responses to the English Secondary School," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 04/107, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.

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