A NAASTy Alternative to RAND Pricing Commitments
AbstractVoluntary standard setting organizations (SSOs) typically require participants to disclose their patents during the standard-setting process, and will endorse a standard only if patent holders commit to license them on “reasonable and non-discriminatory” or RAND terms. We argue that this policy is unworkable—the RAND standard is ambiguous and thus extremely hard to adjudicate. As an alternative, we propose a policy of Non-Assertion After Specified Time, or NAAST pricing. Under NAAST, technology vendors commit not to assert their patent after some previous specified time, but would be free to collect royalties as they wish up until that point. Under our proposal, technology producers would be compensated, vendors would have quick and eventually free access to standards and a large element of uncertainty due to litigation would be eliminated.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Boston University - Department of Economics in its series Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series with number WP2010-056.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2010
Date of revision:
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- Rysman, Marc & Simcoe, Tim, 2009.
"Patents and the Performance of Voluntary Standard Setting Organizations,"
PIE/CIS Discussion Paper
418, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Marc Rysman & Timothy Simcoe, 2008. "Patents and the Performance of Voluntary Standard-Setting Organizations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(11), pages 1920-1934, November.
- Marc Rysman & Tim Simcoe, 2005. "Patents and the Performance of Voluntary Standard Setting Organizations," Working Papers 05-22, NET Institute, revised Oct 2005.
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