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A Theory of Clientelistic Politics versus Programmatic Politics

Author

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  • Pranab Bardhan

    (University of California Berkeley)

  • Dilip Mookherjee

    (Boston University)

Abstract

We provide a theoretical analysis of the distinction between clientelistic and programmatic politics and resulting consequences for policy choices and political competition. Clientelism arises when elected officials exercise ex post discretion over delivery of government transfers to citizens in an informal sector, and condition this on political support. Two party Downsian competition features ‘programmatic’ equilibria involving policy convergence and close elections if parties are equally popular ex ante. If the informal sector is large enough, these equilibria are locally unstable, and multiple asymmetric ‘clientelistic’ locally stable equilibria arise. Clientelistic equilibria involve policy divergence, lower supply of public goods, and higher inequality in vote shares. Comparative statics and welfare properties of the two classes of equilibria are related to existing empirical evidence.

Suggested Citation

  • Pranab Bardhan & Dilip Mookherjee, 2018. "A Theory of Clientelistic Politics versus Programmatic Politics," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-317, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bos:iedwpr:dp-317
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    Cited by:

    1. Bardhan, Pranab, 2022. "Clientelism and governance," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    2. Pranab Bardhan & Dilip Mookherjee, 2023. "Political clientelism and capture: theory and an application," Indian Economic Review, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 17-34, July.
    3. Pranab Bardhan & Sandip Mitra & Dilip Mookherjee & Anusha Nath, 2018. "Resource Transfers to Local Governments: Political Manipulation and Household Responses in West Bengal," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-319, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    4. Pranab Bardhan & Sandip Mitra & Dilip Mookherjee & Anusha Nath, 2020. "How Do Voters Respond to Welfare vis-à-vis Public Good Programs? An Empirical Test for Clientelism," Staff Report 605, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    5. Anindya Bhattacharya & Anirban Kar & Alita Nandi, 2023. "Asymmetric networks, clientelism and their impacts: households' access to workfare employment in rural India," Papers 2304.04236, arXiv.org.

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