Staff Rotation: A Powerful Weapon Against Corruption?
AbstractThe German federal government intends to introduce regular staff rotation as a precautionary measure against corruption in public administrations. To test the effectiveness of this instrument, we conduct an experiment using the bribery game by Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner (1999), in which pairs of potential bribers and public officials are randomly re-matched in every round. The data are compared to the analogous treatment with fixed pairs. The results provide strong evidence for the effectiveness of staff rotation in the experimental environment. The level of bribes as well as the frequency of inefficient decisions caused by bribery are reduced significantly.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie B with number 460.
Date of creation: Oct 1999
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Fax: +49 228 73 6884
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de
Corruption; staff rotation; repeated games; strangers and partners;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Abigail Barr & Magnus Lindelow & Pieter Serneels, 2004.
"To Serve The Community Or Oneself: The Public Servant'S Dilemma,"
Development and Comp Systems
- Abigail Barr & Magnus Lindelow, 2003. "To serve the community or oneself: the public servant`s dilemma," Economics Series Working Papers WPS/2003-11, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Barr, Abigail & Lindelow, Magnus & Serneels, Pieter, 2004. "To serve the community or oneself - the public servant's dilemma," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3187, The World Bank.
- Abigail Barr & Magnus Lindelow & Pieter Serneels, 2003. "To serve the community or oneself: the public servant's dilemma," CSAE Working Paper Series 2003-11, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
- Klaus Abbink & Heike Hennig-Schmidt, 2006.
"Neutral versus loaded instructions in a bribery experiment,"
Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 103-121, June.
- Klaus Abbink & Heike Hennig-Schmidt, 2002. "Neutral versus Loaded Instructions in a Bribery Experiment," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse23_2002, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Abigail Barr & Magnus Lindelow, 2005. "Intrinsic motivations on the development frontline: Do they exist? Do they endure?," Economics Series Working Papers GPRG-WPS-033, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Jellal, Mohamed, 2012. "An anti corruption mechansim," MPRA Paper 38647, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Danila Serra, 2008. "Bargaining for bribes under uncertainty," Economics Series Working Papers CSAE WPS/2008-22, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (BGSE Office).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.