Sophisticated Imitation in Cyclic Games
AbstractConsider a large population of individuals that are repeatedly randomly matched to play a cyclic 2x2 game such as Matching Pennies with fixed roles assigned in the game. Some learn by sampling previous play of a finite number of other individuals in the same role. We analyze population dynamics under optimal boundedly rational behavior (in the sense of Schlag, 1998c). We find that long run play is close to the Nash equilibrium (when few individuals receive information) if and only if the sample size is greater than one.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie B with number 427.
Date of creation:
Date of revision: Mar 1998
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Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
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single sampling; multiple sampling; improving; sequential proportional observation; replicator dynamics; aggregate monotone dynamics; Evolutionary Game Theory; Matching Pennies;
Other versions of this item:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
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- NEP-ALL-2000-02-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2000-02-07 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2000-02-21 (Game Theory)
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