Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Sophisticated Imitation in Cyclic Games

Contents:

Author Info

  • Hofbauer, Josef
  • Karl H. Schlag

Abstract

Consider a large population of individuals that are repeatedly randomly matched to play a cyclic 2x2 game such as Matching Pennies with fixed roles assigned in the game. Some learn by sampling previous play of a finite number of other individuals in the same role. We analyze population dynamics under optimal boundedly rational behavior (in the sense of Schlag, 1998c). We find that long run play is close to the Nash equilibrium (when few individuals receive information) if and only if the sample size is greater than one.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonsfb/bonsfb427.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie B with number 427.

as in new window
Length: pages
Date of creation:
Date of revision: Mar 1998
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:427

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Fax: +49 228 73 6884
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de

Related research

Keywords: single sampling; multiple sampling; improving; sequential proportional observation; replicator dynamics; aggregate monotone dynamics; Evolutionary Game Theory; Matching Pennies;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Theo Offerman & Andrew Schotter, 2007. "Imitation and Luck: An Experimental Study on Social Sampling," Working Papers, New York University, Center for Experimental Social Science 0020, New York University, Center for Experimental Social Science.
  2. Ana B. Ania, 2000. "Learning by Imitation when Playing the Field," Vienna Economics Papers, University of Vienna, Department of Economics 0005, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  3. Alan Beggs, 2002. "On the Convergence of Reinforcement Learning," Economics Series Working Papers 96, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  4. Alanyali, Murat, 2010. "A note on adjusted replicator dynamics in iterated games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 86-98, January.
  5. Abhijit Banerjee & Drew Fudenberg, 2010. "Word of Mouth Learning," Levine's Working Paper Archive 723, David K. Levine.
  6. Balkenborg, Dieter & Schlag, Karl H., 2007. "On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 295-315, March.
  7. Güth, Werner & Kliemt, Hartmut & Peleg, Bezalel, 1998. "Co-evolution of preferences and information in simple games of trust," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1998,72, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
  8. Lipatov, Vilen, 2003. "Evolution of Tax Evasion," MPRA Paper 966, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Dec 2005.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:427. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (BGSE Office).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.