This paper considers characterizations of perfect recall in extensive form games. It is shown that perfect recall can be expressed entirely in terms of the choice partition without any reference to any information sets. When information sets are taken into account it is decomposable into an ordering of information sets, a memory requirement, and the player's inability to deduce extra information from her own past choices. A conclusion of this decomposition is that perfect recall is not necessarily an implication of rationality, because its first part is not implied by rationality. But if information sets are partially ordered, then it can be argued, that perfect recall indeed follows fro
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Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie B with number
409.
Length: pages Date of creation: Jul 1997 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:409
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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