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An Experimental Study of Adaptive Behavior in an Oligopolistic Market Game

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  • Nagel, Rosemarie
  • Nicolaas J. Vriend

Abstract

We consider an oligopolistic market game, in which the players are competing firms in the same market of a homogenous consumption good. The consumer side is represented by a fixed demand function. The firms decide how much to produce of a perishable consumption good, and they decide upon a number of information signals to be sent into the population in order to attract customers. Due to the minimal information provided, the players do not have a well-specified model of their environment. Our main objective is to characterize the adaptive behavior of players in such a situation.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie B with number 408.

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Length: pages
Date of creation: Jul 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:408

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Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Fax: +49 228 73 6884
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de

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Keywords: Extensive Form Games; Perfect Recall;

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References

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  1. W. Brian Arthur, 1992. "On Learning and Adaptation in the Economy," Working Papers 854, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  2. Vriend, Nicolaas J., 1996. "Rational behavior and economic theory," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 263-285, March.
  3. Nicolaas J. Vriend, 1996. "A model of market-making," Economics Working Papers 184, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  4. Selten, Reinhard & Stoecker, Rolf, 1986. "End behavior in sequences of finite Prisoner's Dilemma supergames A learning theory approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 47-70, March.
  5. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-71, September.
  6. Nagel, Rosemarie, 1995. "Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1313-26, December.
  7. Selten, Reinhard & Joachim Buchta, 1994. "Experimental Sealed Bid First Price Auctions with Directly Observed Bid Functions," Discussion Paper Serie B 270, University of Bonn, Germany.
  8. Roth, Alvin E. & Erev, Ido, 1995. "Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 164-212.
  9. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  10. Kiefer, Nicholas M & Nyarko, Yaw, 1989. "Optimal Control of an Unknown Linear Process with Learning," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 30(3), pages 571-86, August.
  11. Garvin, Susan & Kagel, John H., 1994. "Learning in common value auctions: Some initial observations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 351-372, December.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Wilfred Amaldoss & Teck-Hua Ho & Aradhna Krishna & Kay-Yut Chen & Preyas Desai & Ganesh Iyer & Sanjay Jain & Noah Lim & John Morgan & Ryan Oprea & Joydeep Srivasatava, 2008. "Experiments on strategic choices and markets," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 417-429, December.
  2. Andreas Nicklisch, 2006. "Perceiving strategic environments: An experimental study of learning under minimal information," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_17, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  3. Apesteguia, Jose, 2006. "Does information matter in the commons?: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 55-69, May.
  4. Alessandra Chirco & Caterina Colombo & Marcella Scrimitore, 2013. "Quantity competition, endogenous motives and behavioral heterogeneity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(1), pages 55-74, January.
  5. Andreas Nicklisch, 2012. "Does collusive advertising facilitate collusive pricing? Evidence from experimental duopolies," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 515-532, December.
  6. Atanasios Mitropoulos, 2001. "Little Information, Efficiency, and Learning - An Experimental Study," Game Theory and Information 0110002, EconWPA.
  7. Dixon, Huw D. & Sbriglia, Patrizia & Somma, Ernesto, 2006. "Learning to collude: An experiment in convergence and equilibrium selection in oligopoly," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 155-167, September.
  8. Mitropoulos, Atanasios, 2001. "Learning under minimal information: An experiment on mutual fate control," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 523-557, August.
  9. Andreas Nicklisch, 2008. "Semi-collusive advertising and pricing in experimental duopolies," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_25, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  10. Brit Grosskopf, 2003. "Reinforcement and Directional Learning in the Ultimatum Game with Responder Competition," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 141-158, October.
  11. Atanasios Mitropoulos, 2001. "Learning Under Little Information: An Experiment on Mutual Fate Control," Game Theory and Information 0110003, EconWPA.
  12. Altavilla, Carlo & Luini, Luigi & Sbriglia, Patrizia, 2006. "Social learning in market games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(4), pages 632-652, December.
  13. Nikolaos Georgantzis & Aurora García Gallego, 2001. "Adaptive Behavior By Single-Product And Multiproduct Price Setting Firms In Experimental Markets," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-13, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).

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