Two players bargain over the allocation of a sum of money. They are only incompletely informed about the opponent's alternative in case of conflict. The paper investigates two different experimental approaches: the spontaneous behavior of subjects in a game playing experiment and the strategies programmed by highly experienced subjects. The synopsis of these two experimental approaches is a novelty in experimental research and it provides a vivid picture of the boundedly rational behavior in the bargaining game. The paper's main focus is on the agreement outcomes, the average payoffs, the concession behavior and the individual adaption to experience.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie B with number
373.
Length: pages Date of creation: May 1996 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:373
Contact details of provider: Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany Fax: +49 228 73 9221 Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de/index.php?id=517
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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