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Spontaneous Behavior and Experienced Players' Strategies in Two-Person Bargaining with Incomplete Information

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  • Kuon, Bettina
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    Abstract

    Two players bargain over the allocation of a sum of money. They are only incompletely informed about the opponent's alternative in case of conflict. The paper investigates two different experimental approaches: the spontaneous behavior of subjects in a game playing experiment and the strategies programmed by highly experienced subjects. The synopsis of these two experimental approaches is a novelty in experimental research and it provides a vivid picture of the boundedly rational behavior in the bargaining game. The paper's main focus is on the agreement outcomes, the average payoffs, the concession behavior and the individual adaption to experience.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie B with number 373.

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    Length: pages
    Date of creation: May 1996
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:373

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
    Fax: +49 228 73 6884
    Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de

    Related research

    Keywords: Bargaining; Incomplete Information; Experiments; Bounded Rationality;

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