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Which one should I imitate?

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  • Schlag, Karl H.

Abstract

We consider the model of social learning by Schlag (1996). Individuals must repeatedly choose an action in a multi-armed bandit. We assume that each indivdiual observes the outcomes of two other individuals' choices before her own next choice must be made -- the original model only allows for one observation. Selection of optimal behavior yields a variant of the proportional imitation rule -- the optimal rule based on one observation. When each individual uses this rule then the adaptation of actions in an infinite population follows an aggregate monotone dynamic.

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File URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonsfb/bonsfb365.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie B with number 365.

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Length: pages
Date of creation: Mar 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:365

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Fax: +49 228 73 6884
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de

Related research

Keywords: social learning; multi-armed bandit; imitation; payoff increasing; proportional imitaiton rule; aggregate monotone dynamic.;

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References

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  1. Karl H. Schlag, . "Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Bounded Rational Approach to Multi- Armed Bandits," ELSE working papers 028, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  2. repec:att:wimass:9612 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew, 1995. "Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(1), pages 93-125, February.
  4. L. Samuelson & J. Zhang, 2010. "Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 453, David K. Levine.
  5. Samuelson, L., 1989. "Evolutionnary Stability In Asymmetric Games," Papers 11-8-2, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  6. Samuelson, Larry & Zhang, Jianbo, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 363-391, August.
  7. Dan Friedman, 2010. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 392, David K. Levine.
  8. Rothschild, Michael, 1974. "A two-armed bandit theory of market pricing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 185-202, October.
  9. Jonas Bjoernerstedt & Karl H. Schlag, . "On the Evolution of Imitative Behavior," ELSE working papers 029, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  10. Eshel, I. & Samuelson, L. & Shaked, A., 1996. "Altruists, Egoists and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model," Working papers 9612r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  11. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-66, May.
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