Truthful revelation is a dominant strategy in both second-price and English (oral ascending bid) private-values auctions. Controlled observations of English auctions are largely consistent with the dominant strategy prediction, but laboratory second-price auctions exhibit substantial and persistent overbidding, even with prior experience. The experience of having bid in an English auction has a significant effect, moving second-price bidders toward the dominant strategy. Two treatments attempting to isolate facets of the lessons from English auction participation are explored.
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Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie B with number
357.
Length: pages Date of creation: Jan 1996 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:357
Contact details of provider: Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany Fax: +49 228 73 9221 Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de/index.php?id=517
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