We introduce a model of a cyclic game. Designed to take advatange of the recurring nature of certain economic and social situations, a cyclic game differs from an extensive form game in that a cyclic game does not necessarily have an end. The same situations, although with different players may be repeated infintely often. This feature makes a cyclic game essentially finite, although it may have an infinite number of players and may be unending. We provide an example showing that, even though a cyclic game has, in a sense, perfect information, it may not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. We also provide an existence of equilibrium theorem and illustrate the application of our model to an oligopolistic industry.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie B with number
334.
Length: pages Date of creation: Dec 1995 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:334
Contact details of provider: Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany Fax: +49 228 73 9221 Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de/index.php?id=517
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Daniel Park).