Asynchronous Evolution of Pairs How spatial evolution leads to enequality
AbstractWe present a simple model of spatial evolution that avoids several problems that arise with more complex networks of players. We consider a world where pairs of players are permanently matched. These players learn from the whole population but they are more likely to learn to strategies used by their partners. Thus, several features of spatial evolution are captured while nonlinearities that would arise with more complex networks are avoided. We can identify characteristics of evolution in networks such as stable cooperation in prisoners' dilemma games and long run exploitation among different strategies. We furthermore discuss evolution of repeated game strategies in this framework comparing synchonous models with asynchronous ones.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie B with number 329.
Date of creation: Oct 1995
Date of revision:
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Evolutionary Game Theory; Networks;
Other versions of this item:
- Oliver Kirchkamp, 1995. "Asynchronous Evolution of Pairs - How spatial evolution leads to inequality," Game Theory and Information 9510004, EconWPA.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- R12 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity; Interregional Trade (economic geography)
- R13 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - General Equilibrium and Welfare Economic Analysis of Regional Economies
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- Kirchkamp, Oliver, 2000.
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- Oliver Kirchkamp, 1994. "Spatial Evolution of Automata in the Prisoners' Dilemma," Game Theory and Information 9403003, EconWPA, revised 18 May 1994.
- Kirchkamp, Oliver, 1995. "Spatial Evolution of Automata in the Prisoners' Dilemma," Discussion Paper Serie B 330, University of Bonn, Germany.
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- Schelling, Thomas C, 1969. "Models of Segregation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 488-93, May.
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