Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Population Games
AbstractWe extend the notions of evolutionary stability and, for the first time, that of neutral stability to asymmetric games played between two populations. Stability with respect to simultaneous entry of a small proportion of mutants into both populations is considered. Allocations where neither mutant can ever spread are called neutrally stable. For bimatrix games, neutral stability in the asymmetric population game is found to be a weaker concept than neutral stability in the asymmetric contest. Moreover existence is guaranteed for 2 x 2 bimatrix games. Sets of neutrally stable strategy pairs such that for any pair of mutants not in the set at least one mutant is driven out are called evolutionary stable. Evolutionarily stable sets are shown to be equivalent to strict equilibrium sets. Additionally, uniformity considerations are investigated.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie B with number 314.
Date of creation: May 1995
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evolutionarily stable set; evolutionarily stable strategy; neutral stability; strict equilibrium; mixed strategy model; asymmetric contest;
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- Cressman, R., 1997. "Local stability of smooth selection dynamics for normal form games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 1-19, August.
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