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When Does Evolution Lead to Efficiency in Communication Games?

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Author Info
Karl H. Schlag () (Wirtschaftstheoretische Abteilung III, UniversitÙt Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-26, D-53113 Bonn, Germany)

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Abstract

The evolutionary selection of outcomes (modelled using the replicator dynamics) in games with costless communication depends crucially on the structural assumptions made on the underlying population. (1) In conflicts between two interacting populations, common interest implies that the set of efficient outcomes is the unique evolutionarily stable set. Lack of common interest prevents sets with minimal stability properties to exist. (2) For conflicts within one population, inefficient evolutionarily stable strategies may exist independent of whether there is common interest or not. This is no longer true when there is a dominant strategy, in this case the efficiency result of the two population setup is recovered.

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File URL: ftp://web.bgse.uni-bonn.de/pub/RePEc/bon/bonsfb/bonsfb299.ps
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie B with number 299.

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Date of creation: Dec 1994
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Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:299

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Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
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Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de/index.php?id=517

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Related research
Keywords: Cheap talk; efficiency; common interest; evolutionarily stable set; strict equilibrium set; asymptotic stability; minimal attracting set; replicator dynamics.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. repec:att:wimass:199325 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Warneryd, Karl, 1991. "Evolutionary stability in unanimity games with cheap talk," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 375-378, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Schlag,Karl, . "Cheap talk and evolutionary dynamics," Discussion Paper Serie B 242, University of Bonn, Germany.
  4. Joel Sobel, 1993. "Evolutionary Stability and Efficiency," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 93-17, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
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  5. Bhaskar, V., 1998. "Noisy Communication and the Evolution of Cooperation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 110-131, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Antonio Cabrales, 1993. "Stochastic Replicator Dynamics," Economics Working Papers 54, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Schlag, Karl H., 1994. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution," Discussion Paper Serie B 296, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Karl H. Schlag & Dieter Balkenborg, 2001. "Evolutionarily stable sets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 571-595. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Matsui, Akihiko, 1992. "Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 343-362, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Karl Schlag, 1990. "Evolutionary Stability in Games with Equivalent Strategies," Discussion Papers 912, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  11. Karl H. Schlag, 1994. "Evolution in Partnership Games,an Equivalence Result," Discussion Paper Serie B 298, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  12. Akihiko Matsui, 1989. "Cheap Talk and Cooperation in the Society," Discussion Papers 848, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  13. Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1992. "Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 306-332, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Stefano Demichelis & Jörgen Weibull, 2009. "Language, meaning and games A model of communication, coordination and evolution," Working Papers hal-00354224_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Vyrastekova, J., 2002. "Efficiency versus risk dominance in an evolutionary model with cheap talk," Discussion Paper 6, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  3. Sjaak Hurkens & Karl H. Schlag, 1999. "Communication, Coordination, and Efficiency in Evolutionary One-population Models," Economics Working Papers 387, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  4. Brian Skyrms, 2003. "Signals, Evolution and the Explanatory Power of Transient Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000799, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  5. Bhaskar, V., 1995. "On te generic stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests," Discussion Paper 30, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  6. H. Lorne Carmichael & W. Bentley MacLeod, 1997. "Gift Giving and the Evolution of Cooperation," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 338., Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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