Evolution in Partnership Games,an Equivalence Result
AbstractA partnership game is a two person game in which both players necessarily receive the same payoff. For symmetric partnership games it is shown that asymptotic stability with respect to the replicator dynamics, evolutionary stability (Maynard Smith and Price , Thomas ) and equilibrium evolutionary stability (Swinkels ) are equivalent concepts. This equivalence result is also derived for asymmetric partnership games, both in the asymmetric contest (Selten) and in the two population setting (Balkenborg and Schlag ). A side result shows for general games that equilibrium evolutionary stability is weaker than evolutionary stability.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie B with number 298.
Date of creation: Dec 1994
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Evolutionarily stable set; strict equilibrium set; equilibrium evolutionarily stable; local efficiency; replicator dynamics; asymptotic stability; minimal attracting set.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
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