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Evolution in Partnership Games,an Equivalence Result

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Author Info
Karl H. Schlag () (Wirtschaftstheoretische Abteilung III, UniversitÙt Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-26, D-53113 Bonn, Germany)

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Abstract

A partnership game is a two person game in which both players necessarily receive the same payoff. For symmetric partnership games it is shown that asymptotic stability with respect to the replicator dynamics, evolutionary stability (Maynard Smith and Price [1973], Thomas [1985]) and equilibrium evolutionary stability (Swinkels [1992]) are equivalent concepts. This equivalence result is also derived for asymmetric partnership games, both in the asymmetric contest (Selten[1980]) and in the two population setting (Balkenborg and Schlag [1994]). A side result shows for general games that equilibrium evolutionary stability is weaker than evolutionary stability.

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File URL: ftp://web.bgse.uni-bonn.de/pub/RePEc/bon/bonsfb/bonsfb298.ps
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie B with number 298.

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Date of creation: Dec 1994
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Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:298

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Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Fax: +49 228 73 9221
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de/index.php?id=517

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Related research
Keywords: Evolutionarily stable set; strict equilibrium set; equilibrium evolutionarily stable; local efficiency; replicator dynamics; asymptotic stability; minimal attracting set.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other

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  1. repec:att:wimass:199325 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215.
  3. Tilman Borgers & Rajiv Sarin, 1993. "Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 93-47, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
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  4. Antonio Cabrales, 1993. "Stochastic Replicator Dynamics," Economics Working Papers 54, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Schlag, Karl H., 1994. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution," Discussion Paper Serie B 296, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Van Damme, Eric, 1994. "Evolutionary game theory," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 847-858, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Karl H. Schlag & Dieter Balkenborg, 2001. "Evolutionarily stable sets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 571-595. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1992. "Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 306-332, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Blume Andreas & Kim Yong-Gwan & Sobel Joel, 1993. "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 547-575, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Karl H. Schlag, 1994. "When Does Evolution Lead to Efficiency in Communication Games?," Discussion Paper Serie B 299, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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