This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Core Implementation and Increasing Returns to Scale for Cooperation

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Moldovanu, Benny
Eyal Winter

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In this paper we analyze a simple non-cooperative bargaining model for coalition formation and payoff distribution for games in coalitional form. We show that under our bargaining regime a cooperative game is core-implementable and if it possesses the property of increasing returns to scale for cooperation. I.e., the game is convex. This offers a characterization of a purely cooperative notion by means of a non-cooperative foundation.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie B with number 289.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: pages
Date of creation: Sep 1993
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:289

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Fax: +49 228 73 9221
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de/index.php?id=517

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Daniel Park).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2003. "Implementation of the levels structure value," Game Theory and Information 0303006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  2. Akira Okada & Eyal Winter, 2002. "A Non-cooperative Axiomatization of the Core," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 1-28, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Yuan Ju & David Wettstein, 2009. "Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 307-330, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Chen Ying Huang & Tomas Sjostrom, 2005. "Implementation of the Recursive Core for Partition Function Form Games," Economics Working Papers 0052, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Elaine Bennett & William Zame & Michael Maschler, 1994. "A Demand Adjustment Process," UCLA Economics Working Papers 724, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2003. "Bargaining with commitments," Game Theory and Information 0306002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Brennan Platt, 2009. "Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 361-381, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About 1000 archives contribute their bibliographic data to RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.