Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Cyclical Delay in Bargaining with "Externalities"

Contents:

Author Info

  • Jehiel, Philippe
  • Benny Moldovanu

Abstract

Externalities between buyers are shown to induce delays in negotiations between a seller and several buyers. Delays arise in a perfect and complete information setting with random matching even when there is no decline. While with a deadline the authors identify delays both for positive and negative externalities, without deadline they find that, when externalities are positive, there exists no subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies with bounded recall that exhibits delay; and when externalities are negative, it may happen that all subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium with bounded recall have the property that long periods of waiting alternate with short periods of activity: this is the cyclical delay phenomenon. Copyright 1995 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie B with number 234.

as in new window
Length: pages
Date of creation: Jan 1993
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:234

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Fax: +49 228 73 6884
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:234. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (BGSE Office).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.