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The Equivalence of Core and Lindahl Equilibria in an Economy with Semi-Public Goods

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Author Info

  • Valery Vasil'ev
  • Shlomo Weber
  • Hans Wiesmeth

Abstract

This paper examines a model of an infinite production economy with a finite number of types of agents and semi-public goods, where utility of a member of a coalition depends not only on the vector of public commodities produced by this coalition, but also on the structure of the coalition. The public goods are thus subjected to crowding and exclusion is possible. The main purpose of the paper is then to derive necessary and sufficient conditions on the degrees of congestion which guarantee the equivalence between the core and the set of equal treatment Lindahl equilibria. It is shown that the equivalence holds for economies satisfying standard assumptions if and only if there are constant returns to group size for each type of agents. The paper thus generalizes and completes other approaches to core equivalence in a public goods context.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie B with number 200.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Sep 1991
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:200

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Fax: +49 228 73 6884
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de

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Cited by:
  1. Maria Gabriella Graziano & Maria Romaniello, 2010. "Linear Cost Share Equilibria and the Veto Power of the Grand Coalition," CSEF Working Papers 248, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  2. Monique Florenzano & Elena Laureana Del Mercato, 2004. "Edgeworth and Lindahl-Foley equilibria of a general equilibrium model with private provision of pure public goods," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques b04082, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
  3. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00531434 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Wolfgang Buchholz & Wolfgang Peters, 2001. "The overprovision anomaly of private public good supply," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 74(1), pages 63-78, February.
  5. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00085726 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Diamantaras, Dimitrios & Gilles, Robert P, 1996. "The Pure Theory of Public Goods: Efficiency, Dencentralization, and the Core," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(4), pages 851-60, November.
  7. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:8:y:2007:i:6:p:1-4 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00367867 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Wolfgang Buchholz & Wolfgang Peters, 2007. "The Edgeworth Conjecture in a Public Goods Economy: An Elementary Example," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 8(6), pages 1-4.

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