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A demand commitment model of coalition bargaining

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Author Info
Selten,Reinhard (University of Bonn)

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie B with number 191.

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Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:191

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Fax: +49 228 73 9221
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de/index.php?id=517

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Related research
Keywords: Coalition bargaining; Subgame perfectness; Unaninity game; 3-person quota game without the grand coalition;

Cited by:
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  1. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2003. "Bargaining with commitments," Game Theory and Information 0306002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Maria Montero & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2006. "Demand Bargaining and Proportional Payoffs in Legislatures," Discussion Papers 2006-11, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
  3. Klaus Abbink, 2006. "Majority rip-off in referendum voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 1-21, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Maria Montero & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2005. "Demand commitment in legislative bargaining," Game Theory and Information 0511005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  5. Guillermo Caruana & Liran Einav & Daniel Quint, 2004. "Multilateral Bargaining With Concession Costs," Working Papers wp2004_0415, CEMFI. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. G Frechette & J Kagel & M Morelli, 2004. "Behavioral Identification in Coalition Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000006, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.


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