A demand commitment model of coalition bargaining
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie B with number 191.
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Coalition bargaining; Subgame perfectness; Unaninity game; 3-person quota game without the grand coalition;
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- Caruana, Guillermo & Einav, Liran & Quint, Daniel, 2007.
"Multilateral bargaining with concession costs,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 147-166, January.
- Klaus Abbink, 2006. "Majority rip-off in referendum voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 1-21, January.
- Juan Vidal-Puga, 2003.
"Bargaining with commitments,"
Game Theory and Information
- Maria Montero & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2005. "Demand commitment in legislative bargaining," Game Theory and Information 0511005, EconWPA.
- Guillaume Fréchette & John H. Kagel & Massimo Morelli, 2005.
"Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers,"
Econometric Society, vol. 73(6), pages 1893-1937, November.
- G Frechette & J Kagel & M Morelli, 2004. "Behavioral Identification in Coalition Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000006, UCLA Department of Economics.
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