Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

• Reinhard Selten

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info

Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie B with number 191.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation:
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:191

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Fax: +49 228 73 9221
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de/index.php?id=517

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Daniel Park).

Related research

Keywords: Coalition bargaining Subgame perfectness Unaninity game 3-person quota game without the grand coalition

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Maria Montero & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2005. "Demand commitment in legislative bargaining," Game Theory and Information 0511005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
2. Maria Montero & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2006. "Demand Bargaining and Proportional Payoffs in Legislatures," Discussion Papers 2006-11, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
3. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2003. "Bargaining with commitments," Game Theory and Information 0306002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Juan J. Vidal-Puga, 2004. "Bargaining with commitments," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 129-144, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Guillermo Caruana & Liran Einav & Daniel Quint, 2004. "Multilateral Bargaining With Concession Costs," Working Papers wp2004_0415, CEMFI. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Caruana, Guillermo & Einav, Liran & Quint, Daniel, 2007. "Multilateral bargaining with concession costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 127(1), pages 147-166, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. G Frechette & J Kagel & M Morelli, 2004. "Behavioral Identification in Coalition Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000006, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Guillaume Fréchette & John H. Kagel & Massimo Morelli, 2005. "Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(6), pages 1893-1937, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Did you know? RePEc encourages publishers to make their bibliographic data freely available to the public.

This page was last updated on 2008-5-3.