Envy,greed and anticipation in ultimatum games with incomplete information: An experimental study
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie B with number :181.
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- Antoni Bosch-Domènech & Joaquim Silvestre, 2006. "Risk aversion and embedding bias," Economics Working Papers 934, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Bohnet, Iris & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2003.
"Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining,"
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rwp03-028, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Pamela Schmitt, 2004. "On Perceptions of Fairness: The Role of Valuations, Outside Options, and Information in Ultimatum Bargaining Games," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 49-73, February.
- Giovanna Devetag, 2000. "Coordination in "Critical Mass" Games: An Experimental Study," LEM Papers Series 2000/03, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
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