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Evolution,learning and economic behaviour

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Author Info
Selten,Reinhard (University of Bonn)

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie B with number 132.

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Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:132

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Fax: +49 228 73 9221
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de/index.php?id=517

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Related research
Keywords: Structure of human economic behavior Decision theory Descriptive theory game theory Actual human decision behavior

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  1. Mikhael Shor, 2003. "Learning to Respond: The Use of Heuristics in Dynamic Games," Game Theory and Information 0301001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  2. Gary Bornstein & Tamar Kugler & Shmuel Zamir, 2003. "One Team Must Win, the Other Need Only Not Lose: An Experimental Study of an Asymmetric Participation Game," Discussion Paper Series dp317, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
  3. Gerard van der Laan & A.F. Tieman, 1996. "Evolutionary Game Theory and the Modelling of Economic Behavior," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 96-172/8, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  4. Boris Salazar, 2001. "¿Qué tan racional es el principio de racionalidad de Popper?," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 3(5), pages 52-77, July-Dece. [Downloadable!]
  5. Bester, H. & Gueth, W., 1994. "Is Altruism Evolutionarily Stable ?," Discussion Paper 103, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  6. John Duffy, 2004. "Agent-Based Models and Human Subject Experiments," Computational Economics 0412001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Huw D. Dixon & Paolo Lupi, . "Learning with a Known Average: A Simulation Study of Alternative Learning Rules," Discussion Papers 97/18, Department of Economics, University of York. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Francesco Feri, 2005. "Network Formation with Endogenous Decay," Working Papers 2005.35, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  9. Camerer, Colin F. & Ho, Teck H. & Chong, Juin-Kuan., 2000. "Sophisticated EWA Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games," Working Papers 1087, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  10. Francesco Feri, 2005. "Stochastic Stability in Network with Decay," Working Papers 2005.40, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  11. Damme, E. van, 1995. "Game Theory : The Next Stage," Discussion Paper 73, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  12. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1997. "Bounded Rationality in Economics: A Game Theorist's View," CIRJE F-Series 97-F-10, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  13. Elinor Ostrom, 2000. "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 137-158, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Werner Gueth, 2000. "Boundedly Rational Decision Emergence - A General Perspective and Some Selective Illustrations," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997. "What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?," Working Paper Series 487, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 26 Oct 1998. [Downloadable!]
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  16. Potters, J. & Winden, F. van, 1996. "The performance of professionals and students in an experimental study of lobbying," Discussion Paper 6, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  17. Jie-Shin Lin & Chris Birchenhall, 2000. "Learning And Adaptive Artificial Agents: An Analysis Of Evolutionary Economic Models," Computing in Economics and Finance 2000 327, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
  18. Stepan Cabelka & Jacek Cukrowski, 2001. "R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers: Evolution and Aspiration Learning," Industrial Organization 0012005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  19. Alexander F. Tieman & Harold Houba & Gerard van der Laan, 1998. "Cooperation in a Multi-Dimensional Local Interaction Model," Game Theory and Information 9803002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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