This paper studies the effects of non-contractability of investment on the choices made by a health authority and the hospital with which it contracts for the provision of a specific service. We deal with a situation where the parties must write a short-term contract, that is, where they are prevented from signing a contract before making their investment choices. For this reason inefficiency emerges: the service quality chosen by the hospital is too low, and the health authority relies too much on outside providers.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie A with number
578.
Length: pages Date of creation: Aug 1998 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfa:578
Contact details of provider: Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany Fax: +49 228 73 9221 Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de/index.php?id=517
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Daniel Park).
Find related papers by JEL classification: I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health