The paper studies the effects and the determinants of interregional redistribution in a federation of jurisdictions among which households are mobile. Each jurisdiction controls a local redistributive policy that is democratically chosen by its residents. Paradoxical consequences of interjurisdictional transfers arise. If regions are self sufficient, they necessarily converge with respect to policies and average incomes. Horizontal transfers between jurisdictions, in contrast, lead to the divergence of regional policies and per capita incomes. Because interregional transfer schemes prevent interregional equality, however, they also allow for more interpersonal equality among the inhabitants of each region. For this reason, the voting population may in a decision over the fiscal constitution deliberately implement such a transfer scheme to foster regional divergence.
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Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie A with number
543.
Length: pages Date of creation: Sep 1999 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfa:543
Contact details of provider: Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany Fax: +49 228 73 9221 Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de/index.php?id=517
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Find related papers by JEL classification: H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects