Privatization and Restructuring: An Incomplete--Contract Approach
AbstractThis paper deals with a special hold-up problem in privatization.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie A with number 523.
Date of creation: Jun 1996
Date of revision:
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Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
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Privatization; Industrial Restructuring; Transition; Incomplete Contracts;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
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