Incentives for information acquisition in firms
AbstractThis paper investigates the effects of information acquisition in the light of two different organisational structures in various competitive settings. While the intuitive expectation that growing uncertainty raises the incentives to gather information can be confirmed, a changing organisational structure may also create a comparative tradeoff. A move from nonintegration to integration reflects less competition which tends to make information less valuable. Simultaneously, however, the decision power becomes more concentrated, implying that information is potentially more important. We analyse the interdependencies among organisational, informational and market structures and their impact on the relative incentives for information acquisition.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie A with number 519.
Date of creation: Feb 1996
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Information; organisational structure; Cournot oligopoly; product differentiation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
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