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Expropriation and Control Rights: A Dynamic Model of

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  • Monika Schnitzer

Abstract

This paper studies the strategic interaction between a

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File URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonsfa/bonsfa515.ps
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie A with number 515.

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Date of creation: Mar 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfa:515

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Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Fax: +49 228 73 6884
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de

Related research

Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment; Sovereign Risk; Implicit;

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References

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  1. Thomas, Jonathan & Worrall, Tim, 1990. "Foreign direct investment and the risk of expropriation," Kiel Working Papers 411, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  2. Monika Schnitzer, 1995. "Debt versus Foreign Direct Investment: The Impact of Sovereing Risk on the Structure of Capital Flows to Developing Countries," Discussion Paper Serie A, University of Bonn, Germany 484, University of Bonn, Germany.
  3. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
  4. Bond, Eric W & Samuelson, Larry, 1986. "Tax Holidays as Signals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 820-26, September.
  5. Grout, Paul A, 1984. "Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargining Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 52(2), pages 449-60, March.
  6. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, 1982. "A Theory of Expropriation and Deviations From Perfect Capital Mobility," NBER Working Papers 0972, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Cited by:
  1. Kesternich, Iris & Schnitzer, Monika, 2007. "Who is Afraid of Political Risk? Multinational Firms and their Choice of Capital Structure," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 6468, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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