The Role of Tying Contracts for the Optimal Marketing of Durable Products
AbstractTying contracts are well-known for their anti-competitive potential. This paper questions their negative image by showing that tying contracts can be necessary to implement price signals which overcome problems of asymmetric information in the introductory phase of a new durable product. The argument is applied to two antitrust cases against tying arrangements, the German Meto case and the US American SCM case.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie A with number 488.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Aug 1995
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Fax: +49 228 73 6884
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de/index.php?id=517
Tying contracts; price signals; antitrust policy;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (BGSE Office).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.