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Incomplete Contracts and Privatization

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Author Info
Klaus M. Schmidt

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Abstract

The paper offers a selective survey on the incomplete contracts approach to privatization. Furthermore, a simple model of privatization to an owner-manager is developed in which different allocations of ownership rights lead to different allocations of inside information about the firm which in turn affect allocative and productive efficiency. In this model, privatization is a commitment device of the government to credibly reward the manager for a successful cost reduction and to harden his budget constraint.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie A with number 480.

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Length: 15
Date of creation: Mar 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfa:480

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Fax: +49 228 73 9221
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de/index.php?id=517

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Related research
Keywords: Incomplete Contracts; Privatization; Regulation; Soft Budget Constraint.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Boundaries of Public and Private Enterprise; Privatization; Contracting Out
L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General

Cited by:
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  1. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Picard, Pierre, 2008. "Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly," IDEI Working Papers 382, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered," MPRA Paper 13447, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Raimundo Soto, . "Institutional Reforms in the Electricity Sector," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv120, Ilades-Georgetown University, School of Economics and Bussines. [Downloadable!]
  4. Wilhelm Krelle, 2000. "Problems of Transition from a Planned to a Market Economy," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse4_2000, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  5. Shinjiro Miyazawa, 2008. "Innovative Interaction in Mixed Market: An Effect of Agency Problem in State-Owned Firm," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 12(12), pages 1-8. [Downloadable!]
  6. Eduardo Saavedra, . "Alternative Institucional Arrangements in Network Utilities: An Incomplete Contracting Approach," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv116, Ilades-Georgetown University, School of Economics and Bussines. [Downloadable!]
  7. William Roy & Anne Yvrande-Billon, 2007. "Ownership, Contractual Practices and Technical Efficiency: The Case of Urban Public Transport in France," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00107375_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  8. E Auriol & P M Picard, 2004. "Liberal Regulation: Privatization of Natural Monopolies with Adverse Selection," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0403, Economics, The University of Manchester. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Maskin, Eric & Xu, Cheng-Gang, 2001. "Soft Budget Constraint Theories: From Centralization to the Market," CEPR Discussion Papers 2715, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Picard, Pierre M, 2006. "Infrastructure and Public Utilities Privatization in Developing Countries," CEPR Discussion Papers 6018, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Eduardo Saavedra, . "Opportunistic Behavior and Legal Disputes in the Chilean Electricity Sector," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv130, Ilades-Georgetown University, School of Economics and Bussines. [Downloadable!]
  12. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Picard, Pierre, 2004. "Privatizations in Developing Countries and the Government's Budget Constraint," IDEI Working Papers 459, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
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