Reputation in pertubed repeated games
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie A with number 410.
Date of creation: Jun 1993
Date of revision:
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Reputation; Folk theorem; Repeated games; Incomplete information;
Other versions of this item:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
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- Marco Celentani & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1996.
"Maintaining a Reputation against a Patient Opponent,"
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2015, David K. Levine.
- Marco Celentani & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2006. "Maintaining A Reputation Against A Patient Opponent," Levine's Working Paper Archive 699152000000000019, David K. Levine.
- Francoise Forges & Antoine Salomon, 2014.
"Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputations,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
4700, CESifo Group Munich.
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- Israeli, Eitan, 1999. "Sowing Doubt Optimally in Two-Person Repeated Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 203-216, August.
- Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce, 2006. "Reputational Wars of Attrition with Complex Bargaining Postures," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001218, David K. Levine.
- Jonathan P. Thomas & Martin Cripps, 2000.
"Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information,"
Game Theory and Information
- Martin W. Cripps & Jonathan Thomas, 2004. "Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information," ESE Discussion Papers 76, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Cripps, Martin W. & Thomas, Jonathan P., 1997. "Reputation and Perfection in Repeated Common Interest Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-158, February.
- J. Watson & P. Battigalli, 2010.
"On 'Reputation' Refinements with Heterogeneous Beliefs,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
582, David K. Levine.
- Pierpaolo Battigalli & Joel Watson, 1997. "On "Reputation" Refinements with Heterogeneous Beliefs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 369-374, March.
- Marco Celentani, 1993.
"Maintaining a Reputation Against A Long-Lived Opponent,"
1075R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Celentani, Marco, et al, 1996. "Maintaining a Reputation against a Long-Lived Opponent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(3), pages 691-704, May.
- Atakan, Alp Enver & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2014. "Reputation in Repeated Moral Hazard Games," MPRA Paper 54427, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce, 2006. "Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000640, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Jimmy Chan, 2000. "On the Non-Existence of Reputation Effects in Two-Person Infinitely-Repeated Games," Economics Working Paper Archive 441, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
- D. Abreu & D. Pearce, . "Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00f2, Economics Department, Princeton University.
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