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Reputation in pertubed repeated games

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Cripps,Martin
Scmidt,Klaus
Thomas,Jonathan (Cripps and Thomas:University of Warwick Schmidt:University of Bonn)

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Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie A with number 410.

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Date of creation: Jun 1993
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfa:410

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Fax: +49 228 73 9221
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de/index.php?id=517

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Related research
Keywords: Reputation; Folk theorem; Repeated games; Incomplete information;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

Cited by:
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  1. D. Abreu & D. Pearce, . "Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00f2, Economics Department, Princeton University.
  2. Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce, 2006. "Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000640, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Marco Celentani, 1993. "Maintaining a Reputation Against A Long-Lived Opponent," Discussion Papers 1075R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Gary E. Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 2005. "The Influence of Information Externalities on the Value of Reputation Building - An Experiment," Working Paper Series in Economics 17, University of Cologne, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce, 2006. "Reputational Wars of Attrition with Complex Bargaining Postures," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001218, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  6. Gary E Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 2007. "Information Value and Externalities in Reputation Building - An Experimental Study," Working Paper Series in Economics 35, University of Cologne, Department of Economics, revised 01 Aug 2008. [Downloadable!]
  7. Jimmy Chan, 2000. "On the Non-Existence of Reputation Effects in Two-Person Infinitely-Repeated Games," Economics Working Paper Archive 441, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  8. Marco Celentani & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2006. "Maintaining A Reputation Against A Patient Opponent," Levine's Working Paper Archive 699152000000000019, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
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This page was last updated on 2010-1-7.

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