The private supply of a public good

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The private supply of a public good

Author Info

Gueth,Werner
Hellwig,Martin (Gueth:University of Cologne Hellwig:University of Bonn)

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie A with number 40.

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Date of creation: Jan 1986
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Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfa:40

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Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Fax: +49 228 73 9221
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de/index.php?id=517

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Other versions of this item:

Article
- Werner Güth & Martin Hellwig, 1986. "The private supply of a public good," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 121-159, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Schmitz, Patrick W., 1998. "On Randomization in Coalition Contracts," MPRA Paper 13446, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Peter Postl, . "Efficient Compromising," Discussion Papers 06-11, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham. [Downloadable!]
Gersbach, Hans, 2004. "Competition of Politicians for Wages and Office," CEPR Discussion Papers 4261, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Hans Gersbach, 2009. "Competition of politicians for wages and office," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 32(4), pages 533-553, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Hans Gersbach, 2009. "Competition of politicians for wages and office," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 51-71, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Felix Bierbrauer, 2009. "On the legitimacy of coercion for the financing of public goods," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009_15, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
Schmitz, Patrick W., 1997. "Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information," MPRA Paper 6549, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Schmitz, Patrick W, 1997. "Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 52(1), pages 89-101.
Ledyard, John O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., . "Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms," Working Papers 717, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
Tilman Börgers & Peter Postl, 2005. "Efficient Compromising," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000801, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Stefan Behringer, 2005. "The Provision of a Public Good with a direct Provision Technology and Large Number of Agents," JEPS Working Papers 05-007, JEPS.
Other versions:
- Behringer, Stefan, 2008. "The Provision of a Public Good with a direct Provision Technology and a Large Number of Agents," MPRA Paper 11796, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Hellwig, Martin, 2004. "Optimal Income Taxation, Public-Goods Provision," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-42, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
Hellwig, Martin, 2003. "A Utilitarian Approach to the Provision and Pricing of Excludable Public Goods," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 03-36, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Hellwig, Martin F., 2005. "A utilitarian approach to the provision and pricing of excludable public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(11-12), pages 1981-2003, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Grüner, Hans Peter, 2008. "Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem," CEPR Discussion Papers 7066, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Martin Hellwig, 2006. "The Provision and Pricing of Excludable Public Goods: Ramsey-Boiteux Pricing versus Bundling," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_21, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Hellwig, Martin, 2004. "The Provision and Pricing of Excludable Public Goods: Ramsey-Boiteux Pricing versus Bundling," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-02, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
- Hellwig, Martin F., 2007. "The provision and pricing of excludable public goods: Ramsey-Boiteux pricing versus bundling," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(3-4), pages 511-540, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," MPRA Paper 12530, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
John O. Ledyard & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1994. "Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms," Game Theory and Information 9405003, EconWPA, revised 22 May 1994. [Downloadable!]
Patrick Schmitz, 1998. "Randomization in coalition contracts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 341-353, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Schmitz, Patrick W, 1998. " Randomization in Coalition Contracts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3-4), pages 341-53, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information," MPRA Paper 12532, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Felix Bierbrauer, 2009. "On the Legitimacy of Coercion for the Financing of Public Goods," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Martin Hellwig, 2004. "Optimal Income Taxation, Public-Goods Provision and Public-Sector Pricing: A Contribution to the Foundations of Public Economics," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2004_14, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
Felix Bierbrauer, 2009. "On the legitimacy of coercion for the ﬁnancing of public goods," Discussion Papers 265, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
Tilman Börgers & Peter Postl, 2005. "Efficient Compromising," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000188, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

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