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The costs and benefits of privatization

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Author Info
Schmidt,Klaus M. (University of Bonn 0; 26,619)

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie A with number 330.

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Date of creation: Feb 1991
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Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfa:330

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Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Fax: +49 228 73 9221
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de/index.php?id=517

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Related research
Keywords: Privatization; Incomplete contracts; Mechanism design; Renegotiation;

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  1. Dieter Bös & Christoph Lülfesmann, 2001. "Holdups, Quality Choice, and the Achilles' Heel in Government Contracting," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse28_2001, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  2. Faure-Grimaud, Antoine & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 2003. "Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information," IDEI Working Papers 167, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Matthew Ellman, 2006. "Does Privatising Public Service Provision Reduce Accountability?," Economics Working Papers 997, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  4. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2006. "Optimal Selling Strategies When Buyers May Have Hard Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 5747, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Bennedsen, Morten & Schultz, Christian, 2003. "Adaptive Contracting," Working Papers 08-2003, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Patibandla, Murali, 2001. "Equity Pattern, Corporate Governance and Performance: A Study of India’s Corporate Sector," Working Papers 9-2001, Copenhagen Business School, Department of International Economics and Management. [Downloadable!]
  7. Eduardo Saavedra, . "Alternative Institucional Arrangements in Network Utilities: An Incomplete Contracting Approach," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv116, Ilades-Georgetown University, School of Economics and Bussines. [Downloadable!]
  8. Alberto Cavaliere, 2006. "Privatization and Efficiency: from Principals and Agents to Political Economy," Working Papers 2006.99, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Dalen, Dag Morten & Moen, Espen R, 2003. "The Proper Scope of Governments When Costs are Contractible," CEPR Discussion Papers 3992, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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