This paper considers a class of repeated signalling games to gain some intuitive insights into the effects and the desirability of modelling players in a dynamic game of incomplete information as being obstinate in the sense that their beliefs satisfy a support restriction. We demonstrate that such a restriction is rather dubious on a-priori grounds and in general imposes "too much" pooling on sequential equilibrium outcomes. Equilibria violating a support restriction should therefore not be dismissed in dynamic models of incomplete information and may actually reflect the possibility of reputation effects present in such a setting.
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Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie A with number
304.
Length: Date of creation: Jul 1990 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfa:304
Contact details of provider: Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany Fax: +49 228 73 9221 Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de/index.php?id=517
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Itzhak Gilboa, 1993.
"Can Free Choice Be Known?,"
Discussion Papers
1055, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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