The paper analyzes the optimal decision of a raider who can choose between a hostile and a friendly takeover. Empirical evidence shows that the transaction costs of a hostile takeover are much higher than those of a friendly one. The question therefore arises why a raider should ever wish to engage in a hostile takeover. The central argument of the paper rests on the assumption that shareholders have less information about the true value of their firm than the incumbent management. A raider might prefer to make a hostile tender offer directly to the uninformed shareholders rather than negotiating with the informed management even if the transaction costs are higher. The analysis shows furthermore how shareholders can use golden parachutes and poison pills to improve their expected payoffs in a case of takeover.
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Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie A with number
297.
Length: Date of creation: Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfa:297
Contact details of provider: Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany Fax: +49 228 73 9221 Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de/index.php?id=517
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Article
Schnitzer, Monika, 1996.
"Hostile versus Friendly Takeovers,"
Economica,
London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 63(249), pages 37-55, February.
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