Hostile Versus Friendly Takeovers
AbstractThe paper analyzes the optimal decision of a raider who can choose between a hostile and a friendly takeover. Empirical evidence shows that the transaction costs of a hostile takeover are much higher than those of a friendly one. The question therefore arises why a raider should ever wish to engage in a hostile takeover. The central argument of the paper rests on the assumption that shareholders have less information about the true value of their firm than the incumbent management. A raider might prefer to make a hostile tender offer directly to the uninformed shareholders rather than negotiating with the informed management even if the transaction costs are higher. The analysis shows furthermore how shareholders can use golden parachutes and poison pills to improve their expected payoffs in a case of takeover.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie A with number 297.
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Other versions of this item:
- Schnitzer,Monika, 1991. "Hostile versus friendly takeovers," Discussion Paper Serie A 339, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Schnitzer,Monika, 1990. "Hostile versus friendly takeovers," Discussion Paper Serie A 299, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Schnitzer, Monika, 1996. "Hostile versus friendly takeovers," Munich Reprints in Economics 19895, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
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- Mohd, Irfan, 2010. "The Role of Executives in Hostile Takeover Attempts," MPRA Paper 22123, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 15 Apr 2010.
- Ralph P. Heinrich, 1999. "Complementarities in Corporate Governance. A Survey of the Literature with Special Emphasis on Japan," Kiel Working Papers 947, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
- Dickerson, Andrew P. & Gibson, Heather D. & Tsakalotos, Euclid, 2002.
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- Andrew P. Dickerson & Heather D. Gibson & Euclid Tsakalotos, 1998. "Takeover Risk and the Market for Corporate Control: The Experience of British Firms in the 1970s and 1980s," Studies in Economics 9803, Department of Economics, University of Kent.
- Mohd Irfan, 2011. "The role of executives in hostile takeover attempts," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 29-40, May.
- Moez Souissi & Pierre Lasserre, 2007. "It Takes Two to Tango. La fusion : exercice de deux options réelles," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 178(2), pages 51-65.
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