Efficient liability rules for an economy
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie A with number 213.
Date of creation: Nov 1988
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Fax: +49 228 73 6884
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de
Liability rule; Mechanism design;
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Ram Singh, 2006.
"On the Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria under Liability Rules,"
150, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
- Ram Singh, 2006. "On the Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria Under Liability Rules," NBER Working Papers 12625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ram Singh, 2008. "On The Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria Under Liability Rules," Working Papers id:1716, eSocialSciences.
- Allan M. Feldman & Jeonghyun Kim, 2003. "Victim or Injurer:Negligence-Based Liability Rules Under Role-Type Uncertainty, With An Extension to Collisions Of Different-Sized Vehicles," Working Papers 2003-17, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Ram Singh, 2009.
"RISK, INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRY AND PRODUCT LIABILITY: An Enquiry Into Conflicting Objectives,"
Pacific Economic Review,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(1), pages 89-112, 02.
- Ram Singh, 2008. "Risk, Informational Asymmetry and Product Liability; An enquiry into conflicting objectives," Working papers 164, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
- Ram Singh, 2008. "Risk, Informational Asymmetry and Product Liability: An Enquiry into Conflicting Objectives," Working Papers id:1466, eSocialSciences.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (BGSE Office).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.