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On the effectiveness of liability rules when agents are not identical

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Author Info
Emons,Winand
Sobel,Joel (Emons:University of Bonn Sobel:University of California)

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Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie A with number 212.

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Date of creation: Jul 1988
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Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfa:212

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Fax: +49 228 73 9221
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de/index.php?id=517

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Related research
Keywords: Liability law; Mechanism design;

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  1. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Gerrit de Geest, 2004. "The Filtering Effect of Sharing Rules," Working Papers 04-17, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Dhammika Dharmapala & Sandra A. Hoffmann, 2002. "Bilateral Accidents with Intrinsically Interdependent Costs of Precaution," Working papers 2002-11, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. González, Patrick, 2003. "Optimal Assignment of Liabilities," Cahiers de recherche 0305, GREEN. [Downloadable!]
  4. Hoffmann, Sandra & Schwartz, Warren & Dharmapala, Dhammika, 2001. "A Neglected Interdependency in Liability Theory," Discussion Papers dp-01-13, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
  5. Ram Singh, 2008. "On The Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria Under Liability Rules," Working Papers id:1716, esocialsciences.com. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Steven Shavell, 2005. "Liability for Accidents," NBER Working Papers 11781, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Ram Singh, 2008. "Risk, Informational Asymmetry and Product Liability; An enquiry into conflicting objectives," Working papers 164, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2000. "Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0211, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2004. "Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 307-327, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Patrick González, 2004. "Nash Implementable Liability Rules for Judgement-Proof Injurers," CIRANO Working Papers 2004s-58, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  11. Winand Emons, 2001. "Perjury versus Truth-Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony," Diskussionsschriften dp0103, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Ram Singh, 2004. "‘Full’ Compensation Criteria: An Enquiry into Relative Merits," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 223-237, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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