Paths leadings to the Nash set
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie A with number 135.
Date of creation: Oct 1987
Date of revision:
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Bargaining game; Negotiation process; Critical points; Nash product;
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