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Moral hazard and equilibrium credit rationing: An overview of the issues

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Author Info
Bester,Helmut Hellwig,Martin (University of Bonn)

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie A with number 125.

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Date of creation: Jul 1987
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Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfa:125

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Fax: +49 228 73 9221
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de/index.php?id=517

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Related research
Keywords: Credit rationing; Relation between borrower and lender; Relation between the credit- rationing problem and the general theory of optimal incentive schemes under imperfect information;

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  2. Ari Hyytinen & Lotta Väänänen, 2004. "Could Mr. and Mrs. Capital Market Imperfection Please Step Forward? An Empirical Analysis of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Capital Markets," Discussion Papers 887, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. [Downloadable!]
  3. Uhlig, H., 1995. "Transition and Financial Collapse," Discussion Paper 66, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Dorothea Schäfer & Axel Werwatz & Volker Zimmermann, 2004. "The Determinants of Debt and (Private-) Equity Financing in Young Innovative SMEs: Evidence from Germany," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 411, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
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  6. Koskela, Erkki & Stenbacka, Rune, 2000. "Agency Cost of Debt and Lending Market Competition: Is there a Relationship?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  7. Arturo Galindo & Alejandro Micco, 2005. "Bank Credit to Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises: The Role of Creditor Protection," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 347, Central Bank of Chile. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Ramon Caminal & Carmen Matutes, 2002. "Can competition in the credit market be excessive?," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 527.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
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  9. Wolfgang Kürsten, 2003. "Synergetische Merger, Co-Insurance und Shareholder Value, oder: Wer profitiert von "wertschaffenden" Fusionen?," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft 01/2003, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät. [Downloadable!]
  10. Dietmar Harhoff, 1997. "Are There Financing Constraints for R&D and Investment in German Manufacturing Firms?," CIG Working Papers FS IV 97-45, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
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  11. João Cabral dos Santos, 1995. "Debt and equity as optimal contracts," Working Paper 9505, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Hendrik Hakenes & Isabel Schnabel, 2006. "The Threat of Capital Drain: A Rationale for Public Banks?," Discussion Papers 107, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Arye Hillman & Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 2000. "Protection, Lobbying, and Market Structure," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-12, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Karlan, Dean S. & Zinman, Jonathan, 2007. "Observing Unobservables: Identifying Information Asymmetries with a Consumer Credit Field Experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 6182, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Langer, Thomas & Waller, Peter, 1997. "Implementing Behavioral Concepts into Banking Theory: The Impact of Loss Aversion on Collateralization," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 97-33, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
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  17. John Krainer, 2000. "The separation of banking and commerce," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, pages 15-24. [Downloadable!]
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