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Blowing the Whistle Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics José Apesteguia
Martin Dufwenberg
Reinhard Selten
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Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency law, and other rules, theoretically and experimentally.
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Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Bonn Econ Discussion Papers with number
bgse9_2003.
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Length: 34
Date of creation: Apr 2003Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse9_2003Contact details of provider: Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany Fax: +49 228 73 9221 Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de/index.php?id=494
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Daniel Park).
Keywords: Anti-trust ; leniency ; immunity ; amnesty ; blow the whistle ; cartels ; price competition ; Bertrand model ; experiment ; communication ; Other versions of this item:
Article Jose Apesteguia & Martin Dufwenberg & Reinhard Selten, 2007.
"Blowing the Whistle ,"
Economic Theory ,
Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 143-166, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Paper José Apesteguía & Martin Dufwenberg & Reinhard Selten, 2003.
"Blowing the Whistle ,"
Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de EconomÃa - Universidad Pública de Navarra
0303, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra, revised 2003.
[Downloadable!] Apesteguia, Jose & Dufwenberg, Martin & Selten, Reinhard, 2003.
"Blowing the Whistle ,"
Research Papers in Economics
2003:5, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
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"Effects of leniency programs on cartel stability ,"
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