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Cooperation as a Result of Learning with Aspiration Levels

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  • Jörg Oechssler

Abstract

It is shown that a win-stay, lose-hift behavior rule with endogenous aspiration levels yields cooperation in a certain class of games. The aspiration level in each round equals the current population average. The class of games includes the prisoner's dilemma and Cournot oligopoly and thus yields an explanation for cooperation and collusion.

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File URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse8_2001.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Bonn Econ Discussion Papers with number bgse8_2001.

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Length: 6
Date of creation: Feb 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse8_2001

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Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Fax: +49 228 73 6884
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de

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Keywords: cooperation;

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References

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  1. Debraj Ray & Dilip Mookherjee & Fernando Vega Redondo & Rajeeva L. Karandikar, 1996. "Evolving aspirations and cooperation," Working Papers. Serie AD 1996-06, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  2. M. Kandori & G. Mailath & R. Rob, 1999. "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 500, David K. Levine.
  3. Fernando Vega Redondo, 1996. "The evolution of walrasian behavior," Working Papers. Serie AD 1996-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  4. Steffen Huck & Hans-Theo Normann & Joerg Oechssler, 1997. "Learning in Cournot Oligopoly - An Experiment," Game Theory and Information 9707009, EconWPA, revised 22 Jul 1997.
  5. T. Borgers & R. Sarin, 2010. "Naïve Reinforcement Learning With Endogenous Aspirations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 381, David K. Levine.
  6. Karl H. Schlag, . "Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Bounded Rational Approach to Multi- Armed Bandits," ELSE working papers 028, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  7. Dixon, Huw David, 2000. "Keeping up with the Joneses: competition and the evolution of collusion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 223-238, October.
  8. K. Schlag, 2010. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution," Levine's Working Paper Archive 454, David K. Levine.
  9. Samuelson Larry, 1994. "Stochastic Stability in Games with Alternative Best Replies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 35-65, October.
  10. M. Posch & A. Pichler & K. Sigmund, 1998. "The Efficiency of Adapting Aspiration Levels," Working Papers ir98103, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Robert S. Gazzale, 2009. "Learning to Play Nash from the Best," Department of Economics Working Papers 2009-03, Department of Economics, Williams College.
  2. Steffen Huck & Brian Wallace, 2002. "Reciprocal strategies and aspiration levels in a Cournot-Stackelberg experiment," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(3), pages 1-7.
  3. Golosnoy, Vasyl & Okhrin, Yarema, 2008. "General uncertainty in portfolio selection: A case-based decision approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(3-4), pages 718-734, September.
  4. Dixon, Huw D. & Sbriglia, Patrizia & Somma, Ernesto, 2006. "Learning to collude: An experiment in convergence and equilibrium selection in oligopoly," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 155-167, September.
  5. Mark Armstrong & Steffen Huck, 2010. "Behavioral Economics as Applied to Firms: A Primer," CESifo Working Paper Series 2937, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. MacLeod, W. Bentley & Pingle, Mark, 2005. "Aspiration uncertainty: its impact on decision performance and process," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(4), pages 617-629, April.
  7. Alos-Ferrer, Carlos, 2004. "Cournot versus Walras in dynamic oligopolies with memory," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 193-217, February.
  8. Arieli, Itai & Babichenko, Yakov, 2012. "Average testing and Pareto efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2376-2398.
  9. Altavilla, Carlo & Luini, Luigi & Sbriglia, Patrizia, 2006. "Social learning in market games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(4), pages 632-652, December.
  10. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2002:i:3:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Steffen Huck & Philippe Jehiel, 2004. "Public statistics and private experience : Varying feedback information in a take or pass game," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000733, UCLA Department of Economics.
  12. Miklós Antal & Ardjan Gazheli & Jeroen van den Bergh, 2012. "Behavioral Foundations of Sustainability Transitions," WWWforEurope Working Papers series 3, WWWforEurope.

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