Task Difficulty, Performance Measure Characteristics, and the Trade-Off between Insurance and Well-Allocated Effort

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Task Difficulty, Performance Measure Characteristics, and the Trade-Off between Insurance and Well-Allocated Effort

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Wendelin Schnedler ()

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Wendelin Schnedler

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Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Bonn Econ Discussion Papers with number bgse7_2003.

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Length: 27
Date of creation: Apr 2003
Date of revision: May 2006
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse7_2003

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Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de/index.php?id=494

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Other versions of this item:

Paper
- Wendelin Schnedler, 2006. "Task Difficulty, Performance Measure Characteristics, and the Trade-Off between Insurance and Well-Allocated Effort," IZA Discussion Papers 2124, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
- Wendelin Schnedler, 2006. "Task Difficulty, Performance Measure Characteristics, and the Trade-Off between Insurance and Well-Allocated Effort," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 06/147, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. [Downloadable!]
- Wendelin Schnedler, 2006. "Task Difficulty, Performance Measure Characteristics, and the Trade-Off between Insurance and Well-Allocated Effort," Working Papers 0425, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, revised May 2006. [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Accounting - - - Accounting
M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2003-05-18 (All new papers)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-28, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Bengt Holmstrom & Paul R. Milgrom, 1985. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 742, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-40, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Chaim Fershtman & Kenneth L Judd, 1984. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," Discussion Papers 642, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Steven D. Sklivas, 1987. "The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 452-458, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Oliver Gürtler, 2006. "Optimal Ownership Structures in the Presence of Investment Signals," Discussion Papers 103, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]

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