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An Empirical Study on Risk Taking in Tournaments

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Author Info
Christian Grund
Oliver Gürtler ()

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Abstract

Individuals faced by a tournament can oftentimes not only choose their effort level, but also the risk level of their strategy. There are some theoretical contributions on risk taking in tournaments, which mainly point out disadvantages with respect to exerted effort. Empirical evidence is rare. In this paper we analyze risk taking behavior of professional soccer coaches. We find that risk taking concerning the kind of observed substitutions is, indeed, relevant. However, risk taking does not pay off.

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File URL: ftp://web.bgse.uni-bonn.de/pub/RePEc/bon/bonedp/bgse6_2005.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Bonn Econ Discussion Papers with number bgse6_2005.

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Length: 13
Date of creation: Feb 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse6_2005

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Matthias Kräkel & Dirk Sliwka, 2001. "Risk Taking in Asymmetric Tournaments," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse33_2001, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Lee, Jungmin, 2004. "Prize and Risk-Taking Strategy in Tournaments: Evidence from Professional Poker Players," IZA Discussion Papers 1345, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  3. R. H. Koning, 2003. "An econometric evaluation of the effect of firing a coach on team performance," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 35(5), pages 555-564, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Hvide, Hans K. & Kristiansen, Eirik G., 2003. "Risk taking in selection contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 172-179, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Hans K. Hvide, 2002. "Tournament Rewards and Risk Taking," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(4), pages 877-898, October. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Chevalier, Judith & Ellison, Glenn, 1997. "Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(6), pages 1167-1200, December.
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  7. Reilly, Barry & Witt, Robert, 1995. "English League Transfer Prices: Is There a Racial Dimension?," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 2(7), pages 220-22, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Ehrenberg, Ronald G & Bognanno, Michael L, 1990. "Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1307-24, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Matthias Kräkel, 2007. "Optimal Risk Taking in an Uneven Tournament Game with Risk Averse Players," Discussion Papers 200, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Rob Simmons & Bernd Frick, 2007. "The allocation of rewards in athletic contests," Working Papers 005292, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
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