An Empirical Study on Risk Taking in Tournaments
AbstractIndividuals faced by a tournament can oftentimes not only choose their effort level, but also the risk level of their strategy. There are some theoretical contributions on risk taking in tournaments, which mainly point out disadvantages with respect to exerted effort. Empirical evidence is rare. In this paper we analyze risk taking behavior of professional soccer coaches. We find that risk taking concerning the kind of observed substitutions is, indeed, relevant. However, risk taking does not pay off.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Bonn Econ Discussion Papers with number bgse6_2005.
Date of creation: Feb 2005
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- NEP-ALL-2005-02-13 (All new papers)
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- Norms, agency & competition
by chris dillow in Stumbling and Mumbling on 2009-09-04 13:06:46
- Friday football notes from Chris Dillow
by Michael Giberson in knowledge problem on 2009-09-04 19:18:21
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