Solidarity and Performance Differences
AbstractTo investigate the influence of performance differences on donating behavior in a solidarity game we introduce a real effort task. In each three-person-group subjects are ranked according to their task performance. Since each potential winner is informed about his own rank and the potential losers? ranks, they are able to regard performance differences between various potential losers and between themselves and a potential loser. We run another treatment without a real effort task to check for the influence of performance. We find different kinds of donating behaviour which seem to be fundamental characteristics.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Bonn Econ Discussion Papers with number bgse5_2006.
Date of creation: Mar 2006
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Solidarity; Performance Differences; Real Effort; Experiment;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-05-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2006-05-20 (Business Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2006-05-20 (Experimental Economics)
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