Rent seeking in sequential group contests

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Rent seeking in sequential group contests

Author Info

Oliver Gürtler ()

Abstract

In this paper, a group contest is analyzed, where the groups are allowed to determine their sharing rules either sequentially or simultaneously. It is found that in case the more numerous group determines its sharing rule prior to the smaller group, rent dissipation in the group contest is higher than in an individual contest. However, if the order of moves is endogenized, the smaller group will always act prior to the bigger group. Competition between the groups is in this way weakened and the groups are able to save on expenditures.

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Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Bonn Econ Discussion Papers with number bgse2_2005.

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Length: 22
Date of creation: Jan 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse2_2005

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Paper
- Oliver Gürtler, 2005. "Rent seeking in sequential group contests," Discussion Papers 47, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2005-02-06 (All new papers)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996. "Contest Success Functions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-90, February.
Other versions:
- Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
Nitzan, Shmuel, 1991. "Collective Rent Dissipation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(409), pages 1522-34, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Dye, Ronald A, 1984. "The Trouble with Tournaments," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(1), pages 147-49, January.
Morgan, John, 2003. " Sequential Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(1-2), pages 1-18, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Nitzan, Shmuel, 1991. " Rent-Seeking with Non-identical Sharing Rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 71(1-2), pages 43-50, August.
Kyle Bagwell, 1992. "Commitment and Observability in Games," Discussion Papers 1014, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Akerlof, George A, 1976. "The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 599-617, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Hwan Baik, Kyung & Lee, Sanghack, 1997. "Collective rent seeking with endogenous group sizes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 121-130, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Lee, Sanghack & Hyeong Kang, J., 1998. "Collective contests with externalities," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 727-738, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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